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Introduction: The Effects of Selection
Method on Public Officials
Clayton J. Masterman*
State and local governments have long struggled to design
optimal mechanisms for selecting public officials. Centuries of
experimentation have left us with several techniques: election (partisan
or otherwise), political appointment, or selection by some kind of
technocratic commission.I Despite our extensive experience with these
systems, no consensus has emerged as to which system is best under
what circumstances. Several questions remain unclear: What effect
does selection method have on the quality of services that public
officials provide? Does selection method systematically affect the
ideological composition of officials? If so, does that effect matter? And
what determines whether a jurisdiction adopts a particular method of
judicial selection in the first instance? The articles that follow make
important contributions to our understanding of each of these issues.
In AdjudicatingDeath: Professionalsor Politicians?, Professors
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati investigate whether professional medical
examiners or elected coroners provide better autopsy services. Their
study parallels the long running debate in the legal literature (which
includes Professor Brian Fitzpatrick's piece in this Symposium) about
whether appointed or elected judges better serve the public. Choi and
Gulati hypothesize that professional medical examiners will make
fewer errors and be more independent than their elected counterparts
but may be driven more by self-interest than elected officials. 2 To
determine whether a quality differential exists, the authors compare
autopsy quantities, accreditation by the National Association of Medical
Examiners, and litigation in states that have professional examiners to
states that have elected coroners. The results are striking-elected
coroners perform fewer autopsies, are less likely to be accredited, and
J.D./Ph.D. in Law and Economics, expected 2019, Vanderbilt Law School.
1.
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A Nationwide Study
of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1729-30 (2017) (discussing these four
methods in the context of judicial selection).
2.
Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Adjudicating Death: Professionals or Politicians?, 70
VAND. L. REV. 1709, 1714 (2017).
*

1705

1706

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:6:1705

are more likely to be sued. Their results bolster claims across the legal
literature that professionals implement better policy than their elected
counterparts. 3
Professor Fitzpatrick, in The Ideological Consequences of
Selection: A Nationwide Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges,
investigates the effect that judicial selection methods have on the
ideological composition of the bench. Scholars have long debated what
methods will result in a bench with the greatest technical capabilities,
independence,

and diversity. 4 Fitzpatrick's article argues that we

should also care about the ideological consequences of different
selection methods and demonstrates that selection by a technocratic
commission will result in a more liberal bench than a popular election
would. If lawyers are more liberal than the population at large (as both
popular belief and recent empirical scholarship suggest5 ), then it makes
sense that a commission of lawyers will select judges that are more
liberal than those the population at large would select. If true, this
hypothesis adds a new layer of complexity to designing judicial selection
mechanisms, as commentators generally agree (and Professors Michael
Kang and Joanna Shepherd in this Symposium demonstrate) that
ideology directly affects judicial decisionmaking. Fitzpatrick compares
the ideological preferences of appellate judges to the preferences of the
public in each state. The results are consistent with his hypothesis:
states that use commissions or nonpartisan elections tend to have
judges that are more ideologically skewed (generally to the left) than
states that use appointment or partisan elections. 6
In Judging Law in Election Cases, Professors Kang and
Shepherd wrestle with a question that has long plagued legal scholars:
How much does the law actually matter when judges decide cases? 7
3.
E.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Eraof Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007) (discussing the role of expertise in
deference doctrines in administrative law); cf. Frank Sullivan, Jr., Assuring Due ProcessThrough
Merit Selection of Judges, 46 IND. L. REV. 123 (2013) (arguing that merit selection of judges
increases the likelihood of fair and impartial adjudications).
4.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1730. See generally James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit
Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87 (2013); Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular
Elections Are Preferableto Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2004); Steve Zeidman,
To Elect or Not Elect: A Case Study of JudicialSelection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 791 (2004).
5.
Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal
Profession and PartisanIncentives to Politicize the Judiciary 2 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty
Research
Working
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
RWP15-001,
2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577378 [https://perma.cc/SZ4U-LGQK] (finding that "lawyers are quite
liberal compared to the general U.S. population").
6.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1733.
7.
Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Law in Election Cases, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 1755 (2017).
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Legal realists have already convinced the public and legal
commentators that that the political preferences of judges influence
case outcomes.8 But it remains difficult to measure the extent of that
influence, in part because it is difficult to empirically identify cases
where the law and a judge's politics diverge. Kang and Shepherd solve
this problem by focusing on candidate-litigated election law cases,
where politics are extremely salient. The authors identify a unique
signal of case strength in this context: a lower court decision against a
political candidate who belongs to the lower court judge's own party.
Case strength increases the likelihood that state supreme court justices
vote for a candidate, even when that candidate is not of the justice's
party. 9 Nevertheless, justices still display significant partisan loyaltythey were more likely to vote for a litigant with a strong case who was
from their own party than they were a litigant with a strong case from
the other party. 10
Finally, Professors Adam Bonica and Maya Sen explore the
political factors that lead states to adopt judicial reform in Judicial
Reform as a Tug of War: How Ideological Differences Between
Politicians and the Bar Explain Attempts at Judicial Reform. The
authors argue that a jurisdiction's method of selecting judges is a
function of the ideological distance between local politicians and the
local bar.II States with politicians more conservative than the local bar
are likely to adopt selection methods (like partisan elections) that do
not allow lawyers to choose judges. Fitzpatrick's article in this
Symposium bolsters the case that local politicians choose selection
methods strategically, as he demonstrates the skew that selection
methods introduce. 12 Bonica and Sen apply their framework to three
prominent case studies on judicial reform: Florida in 2011, Kansas in
the 2010s, and North Carolina in 2016. In all three cases, political
actors instituted judicial reforms that shifted the ideological
composition of the judiciary closer to that of the state's politicians than
of the state's bar. This "tug of war" view of judicial selection highlights
the importance of local political dynamics when evaluating judicial
selection methods.

8.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive JudicialPolitics?, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 191, 197-211 (2012) (reviewing the rise, fall, and rebirth of legal realist critiques of judicial
decisionmaking).
9.
Kang & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 1756.
10. Id. at 1774.
11. Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, JudicialReform as a Tug of War: How Ideological Differences
Between Politiciansand the Bar Explain Attempts at JudicialReform, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1783
(2017).
12. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1733.
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Several common themes run through these works. It is
apparent that no method of judicial selection is truly dominant.
Together, Choi and Gulati's and Fitzpatrick's articles suggest that there
is a quality/ideology tradeoff inherent in the choice between using
technocratic commissions or popular elections to pick judges.
Professionals may be technically superior to elected officials in
whatever role they fill, but they are likely to have different priorities
and motivations than elected officials, as they are further insulated
from the public. And where members of a profession differ significantly
in their ideology from the general population (as do lawyers),
technocratic commissions can create ideological skew. Bonica and Sen
and Kang and Shepherd show that each observation of selection
methodology is not exogenous-rather, it is the product of complex
interactions between precedent, selection methods, and the political
preferences of different groups competing to implement preferred
outcomes. Together, these four articles illustrate the importance of how
officials are selected-both for examining local political dynamics as
well as designing a government that provides services that the public
desires. These four articles, as well as the others in this Symposium,
will doubtless stimulate further debate and discussion regarding
optimal methods for selecting judges and other public officials.

